Abstract
This paper argues that an anthropocentric fallacy permeates thinking within both technological and ecological approaches to environmentalism. In consequence, sustainable development is an incoherent concept through the weakness of its anthropocentric ethical grounding. Using the Judaeo-Christian tradition as an example, this paper examines the degree to which religion can be an alternative means of grounding an environmental ethic outside anthropocentrism. It concludes that, though religion can also be corrupted by anthropocentrism, insights gained through theology ought not to be wholly dismissed.

Résumé
Cet article soutient qu’un sophisme anthropocentrique pénètre la pensée des deux approches technologique et écologique à l’environnementalisme. En conséquence, le développement durable est un concept incohérent dû à la faiblesse de son fondement éthique anthropocentrique. Par l’exemple du judéo-christianisme, ce texte étudie à quel degré la religion peut être une solution de rechange pour établir une éthique de l’environnement en dehors de l’anthropocentrisme. Il conclut que même si la religion peut aussi être corrompue par l’anthropocentrisme, la largeur de vue ainsi atteinte par la théologie ne peut être complètement écartée.

Keywords: religion; anthropocentrism; theology; environmentalism; sustainability; environmental education

Introduction
Perhaps most notably since the seminal publication of Aldo Leopold’s land ethic (Leopold, 1949), environmentalism has struggled to establish some form of eco or biocentric ethical grounding which will regulate human behaviour. This perceived need to regulate human behaviour gives environmentalism common cause with the world’s major religious faiths. Environmentalism and orthodox religion may not necessarily agree on the priorities regarding the regulation of human behaviour, but they do agree that human behaviour needs to be regulated. In examining the potential for a religious grounding of environmental ethics, the question that is addressed is that of whether the
Enlightenment project of human perfectibility is attainable. The religious viewpoint, at least of the Semitic or Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), is that it is not.

The discussion in this paper centres around what I shall call the *anthropocentric fallacy*. Anthropocentrism means to place human interests and concerns at the centre of the relationship between people and their environment. More simply and strongly, we might express anthropocentrism as meaning human interests are the ultimate concern of human beings. The meaning of *anthropocentric fallacy* is that human beings imagine themselves not to be part of nature—to the extent that some writers have even suggested that nature, along with Nietzsche’s God, has been ended through human thought and action (McKibben, 1989). The discussion of religion in this paper is limited to the western Judaeo-Christian tradition, which is one of a number of faith systems that challenge anthropocentrism.

Science and Religion as the Friends of Environmentalism

In an earlier paper, I argued that science is an unreliable friend to environmentalism (Ashley, 2000). The essence of this argument is familiar: though science is a “friend” in that it has alerted us to most of the threats to the world’s environment, it is not a reliable friend because its allegiance is to the dispassionate pursuit of the correspondence between observation and a postulated external reality. The epistemic values of physical science (Kuhn, 1996) are indifferent to human values and conceptualizations of the world. Thoughtful scholars such as Bonnett (2004) have produced well-reasoned arguments that attempt to show that the deficit model of public understanding of science is fatally flawed. Post-Enlightenment reason and rationality alone will never change human behaviour towards the environment. A possible hope for religion is that if only the “bad” elements of extreme fundamentalism could be regulated, we might have “good” religion that commits us all to an ethic of caring for nature. The arguments to be developed do not support such a naïve hope, but do indicate possible ways in which religious insights can add to our repertoire of possible responses to the challenge of educating new generations about their relationship with the Earth.

The Anthropocentric Fallacy as Ultimate Concern

The term *ultimate concern* was devised by the theologian Paul Tillich in his seminal discussions of faith (Scott-Smith, 2003). Ultimate concern is an intense desire for the success of the cause that claims ultimate allegiance, total surrender to that cause, “ultimate fulfillment” for the faithful, and exclusion of the unfaithful (Connelly, 2001). The significance of anthropocentrism is that for the many people who have lost touch with a religious dimension,
self-interest and the flourishing of the society in which they live are the ultimate concern. It has to be said, too, that religious people are not immune to such a charge. The anthropocentric fallacy is the hegemonic mode of thinking. Its significance is that the imagined detachment of humans from nature allows thinking that puts human self-interest above all else to be profligate, unquestioned, and disguised by a comforting rhetoric of sustainable development.

Some environmental educators have embraced sustainable development as relevant to their aims and values, and a means of maintaining the environmentalist agenda within the political mainstream. Others feel that unqualified capitulation to the kind of sustainable development that appears increasingly to be on offer from U.S.-influenced western governments can amount to a betrayal of principles. Certainly, apologists such as Porritt (2005) hold out for optimistic notions such as development as growth in freedom or human happiness rather than economic exploitation of finite resources or the overstretching of natural regeneration systems. This is a view with which the present author has some sympathy. However, it is difficult to be optimistic about such aspirations, given the degree to which consumerism as the route to happiness has embraced the souls of western youth (Mercer, 2006). Hence, there may be a case for at least considering whether religion can offer a serious and viable challenge to destructive consumerism within environmental education.

Bonnett (2002) argues with some eloquence that the massive consensus around sustainable development is revealed as so much empty uplift once it is realized that a semantic trick is employed to hide the impossibility of reconciling sustainability with anthropocentrism. Sustainable development might be possible were a significantly more nature-centred ethic to replace an anthropocentric one, but this is unlikely to occur presently because of the denial engendered by the anthropocentric fallacy. Really to put nature first, to forgo all the pleasures of high-energy western materialism (including flights to eco-tourist destinations), requires an ascetic of which few are capable. The Enlightenment belief that it is possible to achieve a perfect balance between ecology and consumption through human intelligence means that the high-risk strategy of a technological fix is all but inevitable.

Quite often, the literature on environmentalism and environmental education talks of anthropocentrism as though it were some kind of polarity, at the other end of which is to be found eco or biocentrism (i.e., placing “nature” at the centre of concern). The suggestion, long cherished by environmentalists, is that some kind of ethical education will persuade greater numbers towards the ecocentric end of the spectrum (Kirkman, 2002). This is extremely misleading as it suggests an approximately equal distribution of ethical attitudes to the environment that is readily amenable to change. The reality is that anthropocentrism is likely to be encountered a great deal more frequently than ecocentrism, and is extremely resistant to change.
The anthropocentric fallacy has an intricate relationship with postmodern philosophy, which at least partly accounts for the frequency with which externalities are conceived as relative to, or even solely the product of, human thought. It is indeed a consequence of anthropocentric thinking to suggest that nature is not real, but a social construction. As Bonnett explains, this is partly true (Bonnett, 2004). The human conception of nature is indeed socially constructed, and such social constructions are legitimately both the target and means of critiquing the way human beings act within and towards their environments. Many Marxist, postmodernist, poststructuralist, and ecofeminist philosophers have been able to demonstrate this. Such a preoccupation with human affairs, however, is by definition an anthropocentric activity. The only serious challenges to such thinking come from either a recognition that there is a primordial and real nature that is described by a physical science more fundamental than any social science, or the possibility that creation is the work of a divine being.

Trapped in cultural relativism, an ecofeminist view of nature, for example, cannot rise above anthropocentric concerns. There is a strong argument within ecofeminism that the Baconian project to subdue nature through science has objectified nature and led to exploitation and degradation (Griffin, 1978; Merchant, 1996; Mies & Shiva, 1993; Radford-Reuther, 1992). It is difficult to see, however, the means through which feminist thought can rise to command a viewpoint equivalent to that claimed by adherents to belief in a superhuman deity. Postmodernism would surely see feminism as only a culturally relativist view which men, if they feel so inclined, are fully entitled to refute. The cultural relativism of postmodern and associated anthropocentric forms of philosophy, then, may need to take its place alongside science as unreliable friends to environmentalism.

Judaeo-Christianity and the Anthropocentric Fallacy

Reasoning under the anthropocentric fallacy often has a problem with human nature. As Steven Pinker has argued with growing influence, much of the culturally relativist philosophy of the 20th century has been grounded in an ideology of denial with regard to human nature (Pinker, 2002). On this point, the traditions of the hard sciences and Judaeo-Christianity find some common ground: both recognize that there is such a thing as human nature. For science, human nature is the product of millions of years of evolution and may yet turn out to be a deterministic process reducible to molecular level explanations.

Christianity posits human nature as fallen, that is to say fundamentally disposed to sin through the primordial disobedience of Adam and Eve. In a contemporary exposition, Houghton (1994) describes careless exploitation of the environment as a sin. Thus the deterministic evolution of science and
the Christian doctrine of original sin can both account for the tendency of human beings to destroy the environments that sustain them. The question that must concern us here is not the naïve one of which is the truer account, but the more pressing one of the degree to which each can support alternatives to anthropocentrism.

The curious persistence and resurgence of religion in a world that had imagined Enlightenment thinking would dispel superstition offers a clue. Human beings—finding themselves threatened by a real nature that commits atrocities (an anthropocentric concept) such as tsunamis, earthquakes, and category 5 hurricanes—require a survival mechanism in which concepts such as hope and meaning need to be explored and understood. Physical science does not do well here. It offers an explanation based on random indifference; it tells us that real nature does not care about us, and that our lives have no meaning. For those able to accept this as an authentic position, the situation may be in some ways straightforward. Few, it seems, are able to reach such a position of acceptance and the consequences of its advocacy are uncertain.

Religion offers the hope of meaning and the accommodation of mystery. Traditions such as the Judaeo-Christian, moreover, are rooted in an ethic that denies anthropocentrism. If God is at the centre of things, humankind cannot be. There is a teleology of creation and God is the author of it. This theocentric position provides an alternative account of the worth of nature. It has value, not as a commodity to be exploited, as in anthropocentrism, nor as a self-regarding organism, as in Gaian ecocentrism (Devall & Sessions, 1985).

In theocentrism, nature has value because God made it and “saw that it was good” (Genesis 1:31). The Judaic tradition has been built on the notion of covenant, a two-way relationship between God and humans. The book of Genesis describes how humans were set above all other animals through being created “in the image of God,” with authority over the rest of creation but nevertheless accountable to God. The precise nature of this “dominion” has been hotly contested. White’s argument, that Christianity has through the Adam and Eve story evolved into the most anthropocentric religion in the world, has been particularly influential (White, 1994). Significantly, though, it is an historical rather than theological argument.

Apologists such as Hodson (2000) suggest that such a view does not seem to fit with the notion of covenant. The operation of the covenant that is described in Old Testament scripture, which of course long predates any large-scale industrialization, is heavily infused with land- and nature-based metaphors. God’s displeasure with human unfaithfulness was almost invariably expressed through natural phenomena such as “hailstones and storms of fire” and prophetic admonition that “the land mourns and all who live in it waste away” (Hosea 4:3). The story that is told is precisely that of humans bringing suffering on themselves through neglect of the covenant: ecological and natural disaster clearly being God’s agents of the suffering.

It is not always easy to separate Judaic and Christian doctrine, as the latter
has an intimate relationship with the former. Certainly, the point must be conceded to White that many imperialistic, western Christians have behaved as though God had given them divine license to exercise a totally exploitative dominion. The possibility, however, is that such Christians may have been acting on the basis of the anthropocentric fallacy. It is necessary to examine how this may have come about.

Although the Judaic scriptures are based on covenant, they are also based on a view of God as awesome. It is quite clear that awe, here, does not refer to the sanitized “awe and wonder” in the accounts of “spiritual development” for “children of any faith or none” that emanate from the humanistic-phenomenology of the UK National Curriculum (Ashley, 2000). It refers to the holiness of God that is intimately related to the fear of God. This is expressed in Psalm 96: “Bow yourselves to Jehovah, in the honour of holiness: be afraid of His presence, all the earth” (Psalms 96:9). There is little doubt that the fear referred to here is not simply a synonym for a muted ritual reverence. The Hebrew yirah, yare, and pachad mean variously reverent fear, terror, or dread (Koberle, 2004).

Thus for Jews, there are clear reasons to remain faithful to the covenant, and the Old Testament is abundant in examples of prophetic admonition with regard to this. In Christianity the relationship is more ambiguous, partly because of the emphasis on love and redemption. Some environmentally concerned Christians have attempted to return to the Judaic notion of stewardship through a renewed emphasis on Genesis, Eden, and the gardening metaphor (Houghton, 1994), and this is often appealed to in contemporary Christianity. This is problematic for two reasons. First, the stewardship concept, deprived of awe and holiness, is weak. In a western world which has seen a dilution of the Christian gospel through affluence and concession to scientific worldviews, holiness, awe, and the threat of damnation have retreated significantly. Second, there are alternative viewpoints in Christianity in which stewardship of creation is not a central concern.

Arguably, the root of this is to be found in the ambiguity over Christ’s second coming. In a series of Gospel accounts known as the Olivet discourse, Jesus speaks as though His second coming were imminent (Matthew 16:28; 24:34). There was clear expectation amongst many of Jesus’s contemporary followers that they would live to see the second coming. It is recorded in Mark 13:32 that Jesus Himself did not know the answer to this controversy. Christianity, therefore, exists in a state of permanent watchfulness for the second coming. Two millennia have now passed, and although some of the “signs” (e.g., the fall of the temple, nation shall make war against nation) have come to pass, others, such as the so-called “great commission” (to make disciples of all nations) have not.

The global ascendancy of a third Abrahamic religion, Islam, indeed confounds the sign of the great commission for the present at least. Northcott (2004), in a very powerful critique of the current wave of U.S. imperialism and
hostility to Islam, sees right-wing evangelical Christianity as the inspiration and guiding force of the policies. He argues that there is an alternative Christianity that would direct the soul of America in an entirely different way. This is undoubtedly the case, but the difficult question remains of explaining why, if there is one true, omnipotent God, there are so many different versions of Christianity that apparently serve the political aspirations of mortal human beings. Anthropocentrism at the heart of religion is one possible explanation for this.

American policy would seem to be influenced, not only by literal beliefs in creationism as suggested by the Book of Genesis, but also by literal beliefs in the apocalypse suggested by the Book of Revelation. In the established doctrines of the major Christian denominations, there is a permanent watchfulness related to eschatology, the doctrine of death, judgment, heaven, and hell. Unlike the pagan emphasis on cyclic rebirth or eastern traditions of reincarnation, Christian eschatology is essentially linear and teleological. It stresses a moment of creation (Genesis), moving inexorably to a moment of apocalypse (Revelation). It is directed towards a “New Jerusalem” that will be established at Christ’s second coming—pictured in the book of Revelation as a series of awesome events. Orthodox doctrine does not interpret this “apocalypse” in the physical scientific sense of a mass extinction event. The “New Jerusalem” is not an immaterial spiritual city, but the full physical restoration of the existing material creation. It is through this hope that the meaning of a “new covenant” becomes apparent. Christians assent in their creeds to the “resurrection of the body.”

During this period of extended waiting, however, it is almost inevitable that new thinking will challenge orthodox positions. The Gnostic heresy, a set of pre-Christian beliefs particularly influential in second-century Christianity, has had an enduring effect. Gnostics taught that the ultimate end of all being was to overcome matter. Thus, for Gnostic Christians, the material creation was of no consequence. Only the immaterial spirit mattered, and the existence of the whole universe was seen as a corruption and a calamity. This view is officially heretical, but its influence can be felt wherever the material creation’s importance is downplayed in relation to a better spiritual world that is to come. It seems even, in a confused way, to have penetrated the thinking of American policy. Matter/spirit dualism continues to be the subject of much obfuscation in popular understanding of Christianity. Moreover, the obvious futility of the position that all Christians need to do is to wait watchfully through a primary concern with their own salvation is pointed out by van Hoogstraten (2001), who argues that any insights from pre-Enlightenment religion must at least be integrated with the economic-style thinking that has developed since the Enlightenment.

A more contemporary “heresy” is that of Creation Spirituality, a movement strongly associated with an American Dominican called Matthew Fox, which denies most of Augustine’s teaching on original sin and downplays the
holiness and awesomeness of God. The Creation Spirituality movement has proved attractive to many who look to Christianity for a more positive approach to the ecological crisis. Fox’s central tenet is the replacement of the notion of original sin by original blessing (Fox, 1983). Inspired by a “via positiva” founded upon rejoicing in the unlimited goodness of creation, Christians will work for sustainability out of joy rather than duty (Ashley, 1999). Though Fox also offers three other paths (negativa, creativa and transformativa) which have biblical grounding as well as some undeniable wisdom, his denial of original sin is regarded as a heresy by orthodox Christianity.

Drawing on Campolo (1992), Basden argues that denial of original sin reduces redemption to mere growth or education. A failure to diagnose the real problem faced by humanity—its inherent inability to overcome a sinful nature without divine grace—makes Christian approaches no different to Enlightenment approaches. They are simply “teeth gritting exhortations to follow Jesus’s good example” (Basden, 2005). Fundamentally, such exhortations are no different to exhortations to follow the advice of climate scientists and place human will once again at the centre.

Basden is equally critical of contemporary charismatic Christianity where appeal is made to a “personal Jesus” who rewards the faithful with what they want. This Jesus of the affluent ignores the Judaic notion of God’s holiness, which is rooted in a more distant God whose name Yahweh (I am who I am) was unspeakable and who was uniquely separate from the rest of creation (Jones, 1961). Although God is often portrayed in the New Testament as more loving than awesome, He is still capable not simply of physical harm, but the utter annihilation of the soul (Matthew 10.28). A theology that posits God as a doting parent attentive to human wants is surely one that rightly attracts White’s censure (White, 1994), but quite possibly also one that has lost touch with meaningful doctrine.

This section began with the optimistic suggestion that a theocentric ethic, in which God and His will came first, might offer an alternative to the ecocentric ethics of deep ecology in underpinning thought outside the anthropocentric fallacy. It concludes less optimistically that anthropocentric thinking has indeed invaded contemporary Christianity. The splits between conservative views, resting on the absolute authority of those sections of the Bible that support conservative morals, progressive liberal views that reinterpret scripture in the light of philosophical and scientific reasoning, liberation theologies that align with the poor and charismatic evangelical theologies that align with the affluent do seem progressively to undermine the fundamental principle of theocentrism.

Broadly, three possible courses of action have been seen to be open to environmental Christianity:

- Relative neglect, since God himself will make all things new at the second coming, which rather downplays the role of human responsibility;
• A return to Old Testament notions of covenant and stewardship, which lacks unambiguous backing from the New Testament and is weak when the fear of God is removed from the equation; and
• New interpretations of the faith, which run the risk of heresy and error and lack the accumulated wisdom of orthodox doctrine.

None of these offers a complete blueprint for the human actions that will guarantee environmental sustainability. The need for an ethical system that overcomes the anthropocentric fallacy is nevertheless so pressing that a degree of reluctance might be attached to the complete abandonment of something that might equate to a theocentric alternative to ecocentrism. In the final section, I try to make some possible sense of this in the context of the work of environmental educators.

**Conclusion: Towards a New Awe and Wonder**

The key argument in this paper has been against anthropocentrism. The dominant mode of opposition to anthropocentrism in environmentalism is ecocentrism. The ecocentric position, however, often appeals to a naturalistic fallacy that nature has a moral quality: that which is “natural” is “good.” Physical science points towards a nature that is amoral, operating through geological and evolutionary time scales. When it is imagined that there is a “connectedness” between humans and nature as though the latter were sentient and amenable to contractual obligation, the naturalistic fallacy becomes the anthropocentric fallacy at the heart of ecocentrism.

The paper has shown too that theocentrism is far from immune to anthropocentrism. Indeed, it has presented evidence that suggests that Christianity and God are all too easily commandeered by ambitious humans and the agents of global domination. Environmental educators might look afresh at what is common to both ecocentrism and theocentrism: their core opposition to anthropocentrism. The task is surely to find a way of educating children against the belief that they are the centre of concern, and that their material wants are the first priority. The difficulty lies with the ease with which such principles are corrupted. I have argued elsewhere that environmental education has itself become corrupted by consumerism and hegemonic notions of economic growth, as exemplified by the way that economic “value” now needs to be added to nature by environmental centres and youth movements such as Scouting (Ashley, 2005b).

The suggestion that is now made tentatively is for a rehabilitation of awe and wonder. Awe and wonder (popular notions in the definition of spirituality) are as capable of infiltration by anthropocentric consumerism as any other concept. They become easily corrupted when, for example, vicarious portrayals of nature through media images rather than potentially uncomfortable
or dangerous hands-on experience in the wild fuel children’s inherent anthropocentricity. Thus the notion of the “megastar fauna”—that wild animals have value “because you might see them” (Ashley, 2005b) obscures other possibilities that wild animals might have their own intrinsic value, perhaps derived from their “right” as sentient beings to inflict harm on humans perceived as threats. Environmental educators need to work hard at placing value outside children’s immediate desires for satisfaction. They need to stand firm against the continuous assault of the tourist industry posing as environmental education. Paradoxically, this may well mean more explicit teaching that nature might at times be something to be feared. This is what is meant, fundamentally, by the rehabilitation of awe and wonder.

Teaching awe as reverential fear, rather than the object of sanitized wonder at safe media images, is a difficult challenge. Religious education, over the last 50 years, has retreated a long way from the notion of teaching the fear of God, often for good reasons. Environmental education has certainly had plenty of encounters with the fear-driven evangelical approach of sin (too much consumerism), repentance (a promise to recycle), and salvation (sustainable development). A lesson learned from this is that fear induced by exaggerated scenarios of climate change and resource scarcity is seldom a positive emotional tool for work with children. However, the possibility that climate change might not be as exaggerated a threat as some of environmental education’s detractors have portrayed it, now seems increasingly to loom. Perhaps it is time for the rehabilitation of fear as a positive tool for human development.

Eschatological awe holds in balance fear and hope, and events within and beyond human control. It is thus fundamentally different to sensationalist tendencies inherent in popular interpretations of mass extinction events. Armageddon-style films may be less likely to induce awe as reverential fear than to promote trivialization and empty fatalism. Fatalism may simply involve the resigned acceptance that human actions have no influence on future events, thereby offering relief from any obligation to respond either to ethical principles or to measured scientific projections. This is a view that Craig (2000) regards as “barely coherent.” The alternative of mature theology merits more serious consideration than humanists such as Grayling (2001) are prepared to give it, and does not require blind, unreasoning adherence to dogma.

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**References**


